Aristotle's Moral Habituation & Responsibility in Nicomachean Ethics

The individual's purpose, while non irrelevant, is not the ultimate purpose of the practice of moral philosophy; his practice of morality within the larger social stage setting of the state, which is for Aristotle the "sovereign just," is.

Does it not follow then that the knowledge of this true is of great grandness for the conduct of life? . . . [S]ince politics makes use of the other sciences and in addition rules what people may do and what they may not do, it follows that its break off will comprehend the ends of the other sciences, and will therefore be the better of mankind. For even if the good of an individual is identical with the good of a state, yet the good of the state is evidently great and more(prenominal) perfect to attain or to preserve. For though the good of an individual by himself is something worth working for, to ensure the good of a nation or a state is nobler and more divine.

These, then, are the ends at which our inquiry aims, since it is political science, in single sense of that term (I.i.87).

To put it another(prenominal) way, politics is the context for the philosophical structure and ontogeny of ethics, a point that takes up the whole of I.2. In fact, Aristotle says that ethics and the development of individual ethics must precede the development of the state. consequently, the context for private honest action is decidedly public, although the point is made that ethics and the development of ethical man must precede the development of the state. ilk a musician who must practice

Aristotle's discussion of happiness evolves toward a discussion of righteousness. He observes that the masses, civilised classes, and philosophers all agree that "living well" = "to be happy." On the other hand, "as to what happiness is they do not agree, nor do the masses give the same account of it as the philosophers [= knowing men]" (I.2.88). Aristotle's describes it as the chief or "supreme" good of humanity life, with honor, pleasure, and reason both subsidiary and subservient to it. Accordingly, one performs actions for honor, pleasure, or intelligence, but selects one course of action or another with the higher purpose of happiness in mind: " zippo chooses happiness for the sake of these things [i.e.

, for the sake of subsidiary goods], nor indeed as a means to anything else at all [than happiness itself]" (I.5.90).

Thus there may be political, social, or economic virtue; nevertheless, so Aristotle's argument runs, it is useful, indeed essential, to identify the virtue deemed central and irreducible. That is, the fundamental virtue must be identify as being for the sake of no subsidiary or instrumental virtues, but subsidiary virtues themselves also need to be identified so as to distinguish them from the fundamental virtue, which is the supreme good. To this extent, the supreme good encases subsidiary goods, even though subsidiary goods realize some intrinsic value. Happiness may take non-homogeneous forms for various people, but it comes close to assuming the character of an abstract as an irreducible good.

To say that moral purpose is to be distinguished between desire and passion is to suggest that keen faculty entails choice between what is distinguished when any topic of deliberation arises. When Aristotle distinguishes between moral purpose and such thinking(prenominal) exercises as desire, wishing for the impossible, or having an opinion, the point is to find an compare between virtuous thought and a high looking of reason. Yet the very fact that desires and
Order your essay at Orderessay and get a 100% original and high-quality custom paper within the required time frame.